Free essays available online are good but they will not follow the guidelines of your particular writing assignment. What reasons could God have for allowing evils like the holocaust, or animal pain? His first line of argument is that some evils can serve greater good. I shall come back later with a more shocking revelation about Swinburne and torture. Chapter 3 deals with the justification of explanation. The endeavor to take each kind of evil and relate it to some good is more complete than any I have seen in any contemporary work. Focusing only on the major flaws in his argument, I will analyze how and to what degree each flaw undermines the structure of his argument, and alters the force of his conclusions. His philosophical contributions are primarily in philosophy of religion and philosophy of science.
Earthquakes and volcanoes are a way to punish humanity for misbehaving. There are two different kinds of evil that exist;… Is the evil in this world justified? P has the right to allow E to occur. They are typically bald assertions about what is good, better, bad, valuable, and so on, often in a moral sense, where the argument to follow requires their affirmation. In disputes on theism, he is often held as an eminently reasonable exemplar to counter atheistic charges that a belief in God is intrinsically irrational. Thus h S states that there exists a God such as defined by points i to vii in part a of my chapter 5 outline. If someone chooses to do good over evil, then that Good is greater than if one had no choice at all but to do good. One could only guess and shudder at what rational choices he would make.
The Existence of God reveals Swinburne's signature positions and the methodology used to support his thesis. If this were true, how can evil exist in this world? It is clearly problematic whenever someone tries to derive a somewhat quantitative result using a precise quantitative formula where variables can only be examined qualitatively. Richard Swinburne gives a careful, clear examination of this problem, and offers an answer: it is because God wants more for us than just pleasure or freedom from suffering. His solution for avoiding an infinite regress is thus greatly aided by the intractable mystery inherent in substance dualism. Swinburne is an Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oxford. The problem has two basic formulations, one is deductive, the other inductive.
He aroused much discussion with his early work in the philosophy of religion, a trilogy of books consisting of The Coherence of Theism, The Existence of God, and Faith and Reason. There are some people with mental disorders or those born with retardation that do not have the ability to distinguish between right and wrong, or who sometimes suffer from lack of proper judgement. The 14th and final chapter, where all of this is tied together, thus fails on both the equivocation of h and the impertinence of the conclusion drawn from the argument from religious experience, which itself is based on an equivocation of h. In any case, there are far more specific failures in Swinburne's argument, failures to which I now turn. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the purpose of this book is to promote his generic h S over actual theistic religions.
Cahn writes that the Demon could have created a world in which humans do not have the ability to do good, but this Demon has. P h k describes the prior probability of h discussed by Swinburne earlier, and his goal is to show that h is simple and thus probable even without considering the evidence. Either way, God would not be what Christianity makes him out to be. Swinburne moves in his writing program from the philosophical to the theological, building his case rigorously, and relying on his previous arguments as he defends particular Christian beliefs. If no one were in pain, then it is true that goods such as compassion would not exist. Take it or leave it! One reason for its imprecise application is the absence of any agreed upon method for measuring simplicity.
The evil exists, therefore, an omnipotent, benevolent and omnipotent entity does not exist either. It rests on the following two principles which he argues for. This limitation avoids the possibility of conflict between an agent having free will and God having perfect foreknowledge. Scientific explanations undergird the naturalistic worldview, against which the next type of explanation is counterposed. Many law-abiding, good citizens died in the Earthquakes that rocked San Francisco and Los Angeles a few years ago.
If someone were to consciously choose to do an evil act over a good one, the suffering caused to the innocent people involved would not be right. There is no mention of factors like personal gratification in such rational judgments. Wartick and is made available for individual and personal usage. Richard Swinburne gives a careful, clear examination of this problem, and offers an answer: it is because God wants more for us than just pleasure or freedom from suffering. Finally, I attempt to show that even if we ignore Swinburne's reasoning errors and take his conclusion at face value, a confirmed but astute theist could not derive much consolation from it. They are distinct hypotheses and need to stand on their own merits, up to and until the time when someone can rigorously show that any two or more of these hypotheses are one and the same by matching them property for property. Alternatively, if the prior probability of God is at least a draw, these principles would tip the scales to make it probable—that is, P-inductive—that God exists.
What are clearly of interest to people in an age of religious skepticism are arguments to the existence or nonexistence of God in which the premises are known to be true by people of all theistic or atheistic persuasions. Would it not be better for God to intervene and make this person's judgement better? If God is by hypothesis perfectly free, he is totally unfettered. If no other factors come into play, a rational agent would clearly choose B and C, rather than A and C. The west coast cannot be at fault for the earthquaks that plague them constantly. This is one of the most difficult problems of religious belief. Therefore the problem of evil is only a problem for followers of a theistic religion. Consequently, the cogency of his C-inductive arguments are doubtful, which in turn undermines his cumulative argument via chapter 13 to his P-inductive conclusion.
That is a separate hypothesis that needs to be verified on its own merits. All in all, there is equivocation here regarding h—not a very pleasing state of affairs in a rigorous argument. These modest hopes betray Swinburne's concern with promising too much lest h S become weighed down by too much complexity. He has been generous, and, more so, he has made it possible for us to be generous. Note that my confidence in the existence of my dog sheds no light whatsoever on the existence of my neighbor's dog. Comments will not be published if in my opinion: - the comment might prejudice any criminal prosecution which is underway, - the comment might commit a contempt of court e.
Simple notions and paradoxes make strange bedfellows. So he would give us the maximum opportunity to achieve the good -- in the case where he allowed us to suffer pain, this would mean he is giving us the option of deciding how to deal with that pain: for example, in a courageous way which is a good thing, hence we would achieve that good , or not in a courageous way so we would not achieve that good. . This outline will be followed by an examination of the major structural flaws that I think make Swinburne's argument less rational and rigorous than it appears on a casual reading. Swinburne argues that the theodicist, one who believes that it is not wrong for God to create a world in which there is evil, can logically explain the existence of evil in the world.